On Competitiveness and Salaries - A European Note

Most mainstream economists agree that the deteriorating condition of the Euro is the outcome of the differences between the EU countries . The perception the Union as it was formed actually deepened the structural economic “imbalances” between a thrifty “North ” and a profligate “South," while lacking the correspondent policy tools which counterbalance those deficiencies .

The "imbalances" and the proper short run policy response have generated a heated debate among the political and economic circles in Europe. Needless to say that any outcome from the European deliberations will have an impact not only on the Continent but on the global economy. However, there is almost no doubt that for the medium and longer run , the “South” must restore its “competiveness” in order to avoid a second round of economic imbalances. So “Competiveness” is THE core issue to be resolved.

What is competiveness all about? The idea behind the “competiveness” theorem is that the last decade brought about excessive wage increases in the South which eventually caused the loss of a competitive edge vis a vis the North and the rest of the World. The result was the formation of unsustainable massive deficits , private and public as well. . Therefore , as we are told , THE logical solution is to reduce wages and / or improve productivity to avoid these deficits and financial crisis. Is it's so? Are really wages and salaries the real reason for the crisis?

One way to analyze the issue is to compare identical products and see their costs structure and selling prices : A product is sold for a price and the cost is divided between labor and capital and profits ( 50, 50). If Labor cost increases, lets say to 60 , and you want to maintain the 50 profit, the price must increase to 110 . (In that case the RELATIVE weight of labor also increases).

The same logic applies to the national economy: GDP, the “product” of an economy is roughly split between its "costs" i.e. Labor in the form of wages and Capital in the form of interests, amortization and profits . If the labor share increase, it means that in relative terms the worker take a bigger slice of the economy ( and vice versa) .

The following graph which compares two representative countries ( Spain vs. Germany) i.e. the typical “North” and “South” Economies in terms of salaries and labor share speaks for itself

Based on data extracted on 07 Dec 2011 from OECD. Stat ( Annual Income Share real ULC)

The interpretation of the graph is very simple. Any competitive misalignment between the two countries cannot be attributable ONLY to the Labor costs. I will make use of a simple numerical example to illustrate the point: Suppose that in the 80 a German and a Spanish car car were both sold at 10 k Euros. In such case workers got Ap. 7500 Euros ( “labor share”) of it and Capital got the balance, i.e., 2,500 E . If there was no change in the relative prices, in 2007 workers received only Ap. 6,400 Euros and capital 3,600 . Now, if Spanish cars became more expensive and lost competiveness, lets say 11k, part of the blame for the price increase MUST be attributable to Capital as they got for sure more than 3600 ( in our case 3960 E)

In other words, what the figures tell us is that any competitive loss, if there was any such phenomenon of the Spanish economy was necessarily, among other factors the outcome of higher profit rates. Therefore the burden of any alignment process should be bear ALSO by Capital. The calls to reduce salaries in order to restore competitiveness are economically wrong and morally flawed, as Capital enjoyed a 30 years period of a genuine Bonanza.

This graph also tells us something about the importance of adopting a cross borders perspective. If the European working people adopted a pan European perspective, for example by advocating the increase of labor share in each and every country instead of adopting a sort of national perspective, all the working people, including the Germans ( and the rest of economy as well…) could gain from such common stance. But let´s leave that for another blog ….

Worse than the 30, Ms. Lagarde, Worse ! (or “The Crisis” from an Historical Perspective)

A couple of weeks ago we got another public warning about the state of the Global Economy. This time the warning call was launched by a top economic figure,the Managing Director of the IMF ,Ms. Lagarde.

IMF chief warns over 1930s-style threats
The managing director of the International Monetary Fund has warned that the global economy faces the prospect of economic retraction, rising protectionism, isolation and . . . what happened in the 30s (Depression)

http://www.ft.com (By Hugh Carnegy in Paris, George Parker in London and Peter Spiegel in Brussels – December 16th 2011)

Now, is it reasonable to deliver a dramatic warning about our modern economy alluding to events which took place some 80 years ago ? The answer is yes, as long as the events share some common patterns . So, the question is not whether 30 and 2011 are identical (obviously, they are not not) but if they share meaningful similarities.

Most economists would agree that both events share important common patterns : Generally speaking, both crisis were preceded by a period of economic “prosperity” accompanied with an Asset/Debt bubble . Consequently the violent pricking of the bubble turned into a debt crisis ( i.e. Debt suddenly became unpayable) ,which affected aggregate demand and financial stability. The policy response ,in both cases, was a massive support to the financial institutions and injection of "real" demand through expansionary policies (monetary and fiscal as well).

Up to now, I agree with the analysis, though my reading goes a step forward ( to an area that most mainstream economists simply ignore): I claim that the bubble and the following crisis were in both cases the outcome of a distorted income distribution, skewed toward the upper income echelons ( I´ve wrote extensively about it, so whoever is interested in understanding that point is invited to read previous posts).Anyhow, to illustrate my point please look at the below graphs dealing with the US and think for yourself if there is no place for such hypothesis.... . In an Hamletian style we should say “ To Distribute or not to distribute : That is the question...” . Needless to say the solution lies in recognizing that simple message.

Top 10% share in Income US
“

Total Debt - US

The conclusion is that Ms. Lagarde is quite correct by applying an historical perspective when she delivers her warning. However, as “History does not repeat itself, but it surely rhymes” it would be erroneous to confine our understanding to “Similarities” between “Then” and “Now”; a proper historical narrative should draw our attention to the role of dissimilarities as well.

Coincidence or not, last week turned to be the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR. Are Ms. Lagarde statement and the anniversary related ?

Well, for me the answer is YES. The main difference between 1930 and 2011 is in the political arena: The world of 1930, a minute before the spreading of The Plague (Fascism ,Nazism) was obsessed with the new economic and social alternative model represented by the Soviet Union . Regardless our views on the Soviet Regime during its Stalinist phase, the Soviet model was back in the 30 perceived as a serious alternative (or threat) to the Capitalist order. And here lies THE dissimilarity: Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union 20 years ago, the dialectic challenge to the dominant regime on a global scale has been absent from the political arena. The result : A new wave of Globalization, an accelerated dismantlement of the Welfare State … and so on.. but this is another story for another post.

And how this difference is related to the economic arena? Lets see how the main mentor of the reform policies in the 30 , Lord Keynes and FDR , regarded their work :

"The broad thrust of his (Keynes) efforts, like that of Roosevelt was conservative, it was to endure that the system would survive"( JK Galbraith)
"The Class war will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie" ( JM Kyenes)
“Red Russia holds too much which is detestable" ( JM Keynes)

As can be seen, the whole concept of intervention in the economy, seen by many as a "Socialism" was considered by the its main promoters as than an attempt to save the system of private property (i.e. Capitalism). From whom? The main threat was in the East, the USSR , with its fast industrialization, GDP huge growth , and all of that before the Stalinist crimes became widely known ( BTW, THE problem with the USSR was never the lack of freedom: Just remember how the US supported for decades more than one authoritarian conservative regime around the Globe ….). FDR or Keyens were aware of the challenge imposed on the System and reacted accordingly.

As of our modern times , the Economic system lacks any real drive to reform itself as there is no imminent threat around : No Soviets, no reds.... If so, why to bother to reform? Even Keynes and Roosevelt would agree on that . The results of that tragic myopia can be observed in the half baked reforms “imposed” on the financial system (still (!) able to create exteremely wealthy bankers), .... high unemployment rates with no real policy response ....the endless summits in Europe rushing to decide something before the opening of a new trading session… and above all the return of the Austerity talk with its Deficit Hysteria….( if deficit is the problem , why not to raise taxes ???? ) . As we can see, anything is valid as long as it does maintain the current state of affairs, ironically, the very same system that proved to be fragile and unstable.

The problem is that for the mainstream economists and policy makers there is no myopia, as they are in the game for THAT reason, i.e. to protect the system, not to reform it. However it IS a myopia if we agree that the main problem to be resolved is not “Debt” ( which is by definition, other´s people Asset) but inequality and income distribution . It is a myopia for those who remember the 40 .....

Share of Top out of National Income ( OECD Figures)

My conclusion is that under the current state of affairs, absent political threats or serious social alternative, the Elites will not give up upon the privileges gained along the last 3 decades. Without the drive for reforms , the Political and Economic response will be an anti Keyensian / FDR wave i.e. more Orthodox and austere policies to reduce deicits and public budgets. Even Noble prize winners agree that such policies are a certain recipe for disaster in the midst of deleveraging and weak private demand. ("Keynes Was Right" by P. Krugman)

Such tragic path could lead to a permanent recession mode and a worse economic long run consequences than humanity experienced some 80 years ago. And let us not forget that even the relative mild policies of the 30 were not able to prevent by “new” dawn on September 1st 1939….( WWII)